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THE INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE EQUITY 




This study examines the governance attributes of post-IPO (initial public offering) retained 
ownership of private equity in business group constituent firms in contrast to their unaffiliated 
counterparts, in 202 newly listed firms in 22 emerging African economies.  We adopt an actor 
centred institutional-theoretic perspective in rationalizing institutional voids and the advantages of 
maintained governance by both business angels (BA) and venture capital (VC) private equity.  Our 
findings reveal private equity retain higher post-IPO ownership in business group constituents 
compared to unaffiliated firms and that this is inversely moderated in the context of improving 
institutional quality – where this is particularly strong in case of foreign VC as opposed to 
domestic VC or BA.  Our result adds to the literature on multifocal corporate governance 
mechanisms and the institutional determinants of private equity investment. 
 
Keywords:  Business Group, Business Angel, Venture Capital; Africa; IPO; Ownership Structure; 
Institutional Voids, Property Rights Protection. 
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1. Introduction 
Business groups are hybrid organizational forms comprised of a number of nominally independent 
firms. These firms are intrinsically bound together through a range of “hard” ownership-based 
control mechanisms (e.g. concentrated voting rights) and “soft” socialization measures (e.g. clan 
and familial affiliation of top management), where business group constituent firms collectively 
adhere to common group-wide strategies (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001).  Despite the importance of 
business groups in emerging markets there is a lack of literature on business group expansion; 
specifically on how the constraints of a limited internal capital market necessitate external capital 
infusions by predominantly private equity (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). 
In this paper we analyse the interplay between the institutional context and the corporate 
governance role of private equity retained ownership in post-IPO (initial public offering) business 
group structures.  By developing a new institutional-theoretic approach we address the role of 
formal institutions on the conduct of firms based in Africa.  We argue that Africa is a particular rich 
research context given the exceptionally high variation in institutionally quality across the continent, 
with this ranging from the weakest formal institutions worldwide (Transparency International, 2014) 
to some national governance frameworks being on a par with Western Europe (see Hearn & Piesse, 
2013; Hearn, 2014). 
Prior research has emphasised that one of the main advantages of business groups in 
emerging economies is their ability to mitigate institutional voids (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007).  The 
vulnerability of firms to such institutional voids can be reduced by forming business groups with 
internally coordinated group-wide managerial labour, product and capital markets, paralleled by 
accentuated control across the group.  The functioning of such internalized markets is underscored 
by extensive socialized control amongst group constituents (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). Socialized 
control commonly reflects powerful underlying sociological traits within indigenous society, such 
as familial or clan affiliation, and provide a different rationale for group formation rivalling 
conventional arguments based on institutional voids. This is further exemplified by the often 
intractable nature of powerful family groups within state institutional architecture, prevalent to 
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many emerging economies (Claessens et al., 2000; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Khanna & Palepu, 
2000). Thus private equity investors into business group constituent firms must contend with the 
socialized control over the business group by the controlling owner. The complexity of such control 
is aggravated by the opaqueness of formal institutions offering protection of property rights.  
 We contribute to the nascent comparative corporate governance literature (see Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003, 2010) in developing an actor-centred institutional-theoretic perspective. Specifically, 
we apply this perspective by focusing on the interaction between outside private equity and 
controlling business group entities within focal IPO firms1. Our perspective is particularly useful in 
rationalizing the co-existence of multiple governance frameworks within a single national context. 
This implies that we use theoretical concepts such as institutional path dependence (see North, 1990, 
1994) and mutually reinforcing complementarities (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1994; Aoki, 2001). 
The perspective is also particularly applicable in Africa where European-colonial transplanted 
formal institutions are often incongruous with informal institutions rooted on feudal clan-based 
political economies – eschewing collectivism and communitarian notions as well as religious norms 
based on egalitarianism and uniformity.  The perspective provides our theoretical basis for 
evaluating the corporate governance options available to private equity post-IPO. Such corporate 
governance options are a transactions cost trade-off between retained ownership – leading to more 
intrusive social participation within the business group constituent firm – or alternatively with lower 
level of ownership a greater reliance on state-level institutional architecture and consequently 
higher reliance on legally mandated performance covenants. The trade-off between these two 
alternatives centres on transactions costs – themselves a function of the differences in bounded 
rationality between outside private equity and dominant business group controlling entity where 
these are shaped by institutions. 
                                                 
1
 Such an actor-centred perspective encompasses the institutional formal versus informal dichotomy of North (1990, 
1994), elements of Williamson’s (1998, 2000) transaction cost economics – itself an offshoot of the institutional 
literature, and notions of isomorphic conformity in organizational structure of DiMaggio and Powell (1983).  These 
provide the basis of nascent comparative corporate governance literature of Aguilera and Jackson (2003). 
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 Using a unique hand-collected and comprehensive sample of 202 IPOs undertaken across 
Africa from January 2000 to January 2014 we find empirical support for our hypotheses that private 
equity post-IPO ownership is higher in business group constituent firms than in their unaffiliated 
counterparts. This association is inversely moderated by institutional quality.  The moderating effect 
is found to be much stronger for foreign VC than for domestic VCs.   
 The rest of this paper is organized in six sections.  In the next section below, we outline the 
theoretical justification behind our study and hypotheses.  In the section thereafter we provide an 
overview of African stock markets, private equity and institutional frameworks, followed by a 
section in which we outline the data.  Next we define the variables used in study and the modelling 
techniques.  In a further section, we discuss the empirical findings.  In the closing section, we 
summarise the key findings and discuss the implications and the limitations of the study. 
 
2.  Theory and hypotheses 
While business groups are constellations of firms under the control of a dominant entity – usually a 
family but also state, banks (e.g. Japanese keiretsu), corporate, informal or individual interests – all 
subordinate firms commonly adhere to a joint group-wide strategy (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001).  The 
extended group is a hybrid organizational structure – where its coordinated strategy between 
constituents infers it falls outside the classical boundary of the firm yet within the scope of 
frictionless markets (Williamson, 2000). In past literature the main arguments rationalizing the 
formation of business groups are based on deficiencies in state-level financial and legal architecture 
and/or a weak institutional environment leading to prohibitive transactions costs (Williamson, 1998, 
2000). Such weaknesses commonly arise from a lack of efficient intermediaries in external markets 
for products, labour and capital (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007).  Such inefficiencies lead to a necessity in 
internalising the intermediation function of these markets through a better-performing group-wide 
resource coordination system.2 
                                                 
2
 Emerging economy business groups are typically diversified across industries and attract a market valuation premium 
for this – where the opposite would be true for such diversification in developed economies (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). 
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 Past research (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001) indicates that religious and 
familial altruism can provide the social “glue” binding the business group members together, as 
these institutions3 employ socialized control mechanisms across the wider group. This “glue” is also 
shown by the fact that within the business group there is commonly a complex managerial 
coordination system – with resource allocation being made in accordance to social status and 
within-group institutionalized rules of action (Ocasio, 1999).  The institutionalized nature of this 
social cohesion promotes trust between group members, enhancing group-based social capital.  The 
institutional-theoretic argument above rationalizes business group formation in terms of networks-
based trust that helps to circumvent institutional voids. This argument based on institutional 
complementarities (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) alludes to broader mutually reinforcing institutional 
elements (Millgrom & Roberts, 1994; Aoki, 2001) that originate from the deeper societal matrix.  
Overall the institutional perspective places considerable emphasis on the inherent social nature of 
business groups. 
 In order to enhance the efficiencies associated with resource provision in internal capital 
markets, business groups often take over and internalize a specialized financial services firm, such 
as a commercial bank or VC entity (Khanna & Palepu, 2000).  Business group expansion – either 
through additional diversification of activities or calving i.e. the formation of subordinate founder-
led groups from within the parent group structure – stretches financial resources and necessitates the 
raising of outside private equity capital.  Group-constituent firms are in a particularly strategically 
advantageous position in being able to leverage on the wider group reputation or brand in 
facilitating trust and to attract external investment (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001).  Trust is instrumental 
in their attainment of credibility in contracting (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001).  
                                                                                                                                                                  
The emerging market premium assists business groups in attaining geographical and industry risk diversification – 
where sector concentration otherwise renders firms vulnerable to the significant macroeconomic and policy instability 
ubiquitous to many emerging economies. Such group-based diversification of cash flow also contributes to a group-
wide income smoothing and to a more efficient allocation of the group-based internal capital markets. 
3
 In this context we refer to North (1991)’s dichotomous definition of institutions being formal and informal.  The 
former refers to formal governmental, political, legal mechanisms while the latter refers to norms, social values, 
religious ideals and other deeper sociological notions and behavioural norms. 
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African IPO firms’ access to private equity investors is at a low absolute level but still essential for 
capital infusions to augment provision by internal markets. 
 A critical dimension in capital market intermediation is the intertemporal dimension of 
investment, which draws on the relative longevity of investment time horizons of actors.  Large 
extended family entities – particularly in emerging economies with minimal, if any, state social 
welfare provision (Levy, 2008) – are largely motivated by intergenerational transfer of capital.  
Thus in diversified groups investment horizons associated with internal capital markets may be 
significantly longer in focussing on long-term value and the social significance of a constituent 
firm’s operations than those of outside private equity investors.  The longer horizons are especially 
prominent in the operations of group-wide internal markets, where a combination of investment 
over multiple periods and shareholder tunnelling appear together with mechanisms such as transfer 
pricing and expropriation used to redistribute capital around group members (La Porta et al., 1997, 
1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, Claessens et al., 1999, 2000).  Hence, conflicts of interest may 
occur with the shorter-time horizons associated with profit-motivated external investors – such as 
private equity.  Furthermore these horizons are also associated with expropriation. Differences of 
time horizon preferences between investor groups underscore the considerable moral hazard costs 
associated with external principals infusing capital into group-constituent firms. These costs being 
encompassed within broader transactions costs associated with differences in bounded rationality 
between group members and outsiders may lead to “conflicting voices” within the organization 
(Hoskisson et al., 2002). 
 The inherent differences in the institutional environments - within which business group 
constituent firms and their respective external private equity investors are socially embedded - are 
reflected in different degrees of bounded rationality of these actors (Hoskisson et al., 2002). While 
the different degrees encompass moral hazard risks they also encapsulate levels of opportunism and 
the intendedly rational nature of actors – where this rationality is distinctively shaped by the 
respective indigenous institutional frameworks (Williamson, 1998).  Such differences in bounded 
rationality between actors generate transactions costs – where the mitigation of these places a 
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central emphasis on ex-post governance structure (Williamson, 1998, 2000).  Thus at an IPO there 
is an important choice between private equity’s retained ownership and intrusive social participation 
(see Bruton et al., 2010) within business groups, on the one hand, and a reduction in ownership and 
greater reliance on performance-based contracts and covenants, on the other (Sahlman, 1990; 
Gompers & Lerner, 1996).  This view forms the basis of our theoretical model of the interaction 
between private equity and business group constituent firms. 
 
2.1 Business groups and institutions in emerging economies 
We argue that while there is a strong rationale for the institutional void arguments in relation to the 
functioning of business groups, there are equally strong socio-cognitive arguments relating to the 
formation of such groups.  Last-mentioned arguments are particularly pertinent in underscoring the 
extended social system and inter-relationships amongst group-members that underpins the 
efficiency of the internal resource coordination system.  They also shape the distinctive bounded 
rationality of business group constituent actors – thereby defining transactions costs and related 
moral hazard with respect to outside investor principals such as private equity. 
 A distinctive characteristic of many emerging economies is the incongruity – or lack of fit – 
between formal institutional frameworks and their informal counterparts.  We acknowledge the 
common complementary nature of various corporate governance mechanisms. For example, a 
sophisticated system of institutional complementarities together with associated institutionalized 
“pressures” eschewing isomorphic conformity4 inherent in the group structure (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983), and this further perpetuates incongruities between formal and informal governance 
frameworks within societies.  Complementarities between institutional elements infer that the value 
of any given institutional element is optimised only in the presence of mutually supportive 
institutional elements (Millgrom & Roberts, 1994; Aoki, 2001).  Firstly, this underscores the 
importance of their mutually interdependent reinforcing nature, which in turn facilitates the 
                                                 
4
 These pressures are coercive, defined in terms of formal government regulations and laws, normative, defined as 
cultural and societal expectations, and mimetic, defined as the need to copy other organizations within an industry or 
economic sector in order to alleviate environmental uncertainties (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
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formation of a wider governance framework.  Secondly, it emphasizes the importance of the social 
context within which the endogenous evolution of an institutional framework takes place.  It also 
explains the co-existence of more than one governance framework within a national context 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003), where this institutionalized explanation fits with evidence of a similar 
co-existence of multiple economic equilibria within African societies in the economics literature 
(Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011). 
 Finally, we propose that developing an actor-centred institutional perspective, with its 
emphasis on the co-existence of multiple governance frameworks, helps to explain the pervasive 
presence of business groups in both low and high institutional quality environments. This 
perspective questions the traditional institutional “void” view in which business group formation is 
based solely on deficiencies in state architecture or institutions. Furthermore it addresses shortfalls 
in agency where the under-socialized perspective is based solely on deficiencies in bilateral 
contracts between principals and their agents, and over-socialized traditional institutionalist 
perspectives where these are constrained to an aggregate uniform national level (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003). Our view is also in line with the view of Granovetter (2005) “…that business 
groups are networks that facilitate the creation of “trust”, which makes up for incomplete contracts 
and imperfect rule of law” (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007: 348).  However, this is at odds with anecdotal 
evidence from across North Africa, and Tunisia and Morocco in particular (Hearn, 2014). While 
family-centred business groups are prolific and permeate traditional secular distinctions between 
public and private economic realms, state institutions have been consistently ranked as the highest 
quality institutions across Africa and on a par with Western Europe (Transparency International, 
2014). Thus, the case of Africa highlights that the interplay between institutions and the presence of 
business groups is much more complex and at odds with the view put forth by the existing literature. 
 
2.2 Private equity ownership retention in business groups 
Private equity (PE) can be viewed in terms of two very different constituent types of investor: 
formal and informal.  The former is characterised by venture capital (VC) while the latter is typified 
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by business angels (BA). We argue that retained PE ownership in IPO firm’s constituent to business 
groups distinguishes it from retained ownership of unaffiliated counterparts. Our view is based on 
the premise that private equity entities face - as previously stated - two ex-post governance options 
at IPO: that of intrusive social participation within focal firm’s organizational structure associated 
with retained ownership or a reliance on legally protected and mandated performance-based 
contracts and covenants.  The choice between these two forms of governance is largely determined 
on the degree of moral hazard – encompassed within transactions costs – associated with the 
business group entity.  This arises from the inherent incompleteness of contracts – in terms of being 
unable to capture every possible eventuality and human behaviour of actors to contract – justifying 
the focus on appropriate ex-post governance arrangements (Williamson, 1998, 2000). 
 Institutional theory posits considerable differences between PE entities where these 
differences are a reflection of the social environment within which the entities are inextricably 
embedded (Granovetter, 1985).  Informal BA investors as well as indigenous “domestic” VC are 
embedded within same social context as their investee firms.  In this context they too are subject to 
the same notions of cognitive and religious-moral legitimacy regarding extended clan and familial 
networks.  Business groups adopt a relationship-focus to their contracting – where this is typically 
based on trust and notions of social reciprocity – although these norms are offset by professional 
private equity industry norms that are shaped on globally dominant US PE market (Bruton et al, 
2005).  By comparison “foreign” VC are subject only to US VC industry norms inferring a greater 
reliance on impartial formal state institutional quality to enforce contracting.  However we argue 
that all three types of PE are aware of the necessity to attain a degree of cognitive legitimacy – 
necessitating adaptation of investment models to “fit” indigenous social environment within which 
their transactions are embedded.  This infers a much greater emphasis on socialized relationships in 
order to mitigate contracting costs. 
Business group constituents are able to draw upon extensive internal capital, labour and 
product markets – that fall under the common management of the entity (usually a family) 
controlling the group structure. This places a central emphasis on the socialized inter-relationships 
 10 
within the controlling entity, including levels of familial and religious altruism (Schulze et al., 2003; 
Randøy & Goel, 2003), and the social capital within such a fundamentally closed network. 
Furthermore the social relationships – including those of social status – determine the efficiency of 
internal resource coordination system, the longevity of the investment horizon, and the degree of 
protection of property rights afforded to outside investors (principals). The social cohesion – often 
based on altruistic bonds rooted on deeper societal structures such as clan or extended familial 
allegiances – shapes the bounded rationality of group constituents.  Furthermore the presence of 
these extended supportive internal markets acts to nurture firms thereby circumventing voids in the 
external contracting environment inhibiting access to resources and efficient intermediaries.  Thus 
business group constituents are a more attractive investment proposition for private equity entities 
compared to non-group independent firms – where these lack the access to resources of their 
within-group counterparts.  On this basis we argue that group-affiliated firms are more likely to 
attract higher levels of private equity investment with this being maintained due to their 
attractiveness as investment opportunities for private equity investors. 
 Furthermore, we argue that all private equity investors are aware of the risks arising from 
moral hazard – where these are encapsulated in the way these investors try to minimize the broader 
transactions costs. These risks are accentuated given private equity entities are subject to the 
professionalized industry norms from dominant US private equity industry (Bruton et al, 2005) – 
where these are partially offset by indigenous norms arising from cognitive and religious-moral 
sociological structures. Given the central importance of trust and social relationships in network 
economies – these tend to be fundamentally closed and internal in terms of markets and resource 
coordination (Hoskisson et al, 2004).  This is very different from the open external markets systems 
upon which US-based industry norms and governance frameworks are based. Thus there is a 
marked emphasis on socialized relationships to alleviate otherwise prohibitive transactions costs in 
contracting between all private equity entities and business group constituent firms. While this is on 
the one hand a reflection of the need to alleviate moral hazard risks (see Claessens et al, 1999, 2000) 
 11 
through continued socialized interaction with the wider business group – on the other hand it 
mirrors the need for private equity entities to attain indigenous cognitive and moral legitimacy. 
 The institution-theoretic perspective above motivates us to put forth the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  There is a positive association between being a business group constituent IPO firm 
and post-IPO private equity ownership retention 
 
2.3 The moderating impact of institutional quality 
We argue that the association between retained ownership by outsider private equity investors and 
business group constituent firms is moderated by formal institutional quality. The effect of 
institutional quality is twofold. Firstly, the elevated quality of impartial state-level architecture 
provides an alternate mechanism for otherwise disadvantaged minority outside investors in terms of 
protection of property rights. Outside investors – such as private equity – can adopt legally 
mandated governance mechanisms through the employment of performance related contracts and 
covenants. These are optimal, given the presence of high institutional quality yielding protection 
and enforcement of property rights. 
 Secondly, institutional theory helps us to understand why PE prefers business group 
constituent firms.  Higher institutional quality infers not only the transplantation of the institutional 
elements of foreign “best practice”, but critically also their successful adaptation and assimilation 
within the indigenous societal matrix.  While Bruton et al (2010) elaborate on the differences 
between BA and VC variants of PE, we argue that both are profoundly impacted by elevated 
institutional quality in emerging economies. This has two further implications.  It infers greater 
acceptance and understanding of market-orientated governance systems – that are central to 
development policy (Hoskisson et al., 2004) – amongst indigenous population, which in turn infers 
that BA investors are more susceptible to notions of divestment and exit from their early-stage 
investments. It also means greater resonance – or institutional compatibility – between higher 
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quality impartial state architecture and the market-orientated norms of VC investors, where these 
are based on those of the globally dominant US private equity industry (Bruton et al., 2005).  From 
this the IPO is seen as divestment or exit event (Bruton et al., 2005).  It also follows that notions of 
impartial state architecture and formal institutional quality are central to foreign VC norms and 
investment preferences in particular (Bruton et al., 2005).  In contrast BA and domestic VC are less 
likely influenced by norms shaped on the importance of impartial formal institutional quality with 
these being subject to greater influence of indigenous societal values. 
 In the light of the theory-based arguments outlined above we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The association between private equity ownership post-IPO retention and business 
groups constituent IPO-firms is negatively moderated by institutional quality 
 
3.  African stock markets, private equity and business groups 
In the period 2000 – 2014 the numbers of firms undertaking an IPO across Africa are, as shown in 
Table 1 - relatively concentrated in the North African exchanges of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia 
while in Sub Saharan Africa there is an equal concentration between Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana.  
The majority of other markets across the region have few IPOs and with these typically involving 
state privatizations. South Africa (the largest market) are notable in being a large and well 
developed market with an absence of IPOs due to liquidity concerns underscoring a propensity of 
private placements. 
Many of the new listings across the North African region – in Tunisia, Morocco and Cape 
Verde - are influenced by far-reaching programmes of corporate tax breaks stimulating precipitation 
of IPOs from fragile private sectors (see Hearn & Piesse, 2013; Hearn, 2014). A large fraction of 
these privatizations emanate from smaller fledgling frontier markets, largely established as an 
outcome of structural adjustment programmes, while a high concentration in Egypt is the result of 
its transition from socialism (see Hearn, 2014). Finally, it is notable that - with the exceptions of 
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Mauritius and Nigeria - family-centred business groups proliferate across the North African region.  
The number of non-family business group IPOs are minimal compared to their familial counterparts.  
These are centred on state – such as Tunisian state absorbing the assets of former premier Ben-Ali 
and Trabelsi – on quasi-state entities – such as Press Trust group in Malawi which is based on 
presidency – or individuals with informal groups such as in Botswana. 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
A comparison of the investment profiles of BA, domestic and foreign VC is provided in Table 2.  
Several observations can be made. The first is that syndicate sizes are larger for both foreign and 
domestic VC than for BA investors. The process of syndication is itself a mechanism for the 
provision of on-going monitoring and surveillance of investments (reduction of ex-post moral 
hazard) where multiple private equity entities within a syndicate are able to assess each other’s 
appraisals of the target investee firm (Barry et al., 1990; Sahlman, 1990). Syndicated VC 
investments are particularly common in high risk environments (Barry et al, 1990; Lerner, 1994). 
 There are noticeably very few exits – with one each for domestic and foreign VC 
respectively and none for BA. The lack of divestment of holdings at IPO is apparent from the 
number of IPOs in which the overall level of private equity ownership is unchanged with this being 
3 IPOs in case of foreign VC and then 6 IPOs for domestic VC and 7 IPOs for BAs. 
 In terms of the type of VC activity, foreign VC activities are overwhelmingly dominated by 
those administered by state and development agencies (72%) with a much lower (8%) proportion 
administered through commercial banks. Contrastingly, domestic VC activities are largely 
administered through individual private equity partnerships or agencies operating funds (52.27%) 
while just below 30% are administered by indigenous state and development agencies. It is notable 
that the majority of private equity investments are in North as opposed to Sub Saharan Africa. This 
reflects the relative economic prosperity and levels of institutional development in Northern Africa. 
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This is also reflected in the significant target industry concentrations of private equity investment 
which justifies our later employment of industry controls. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
When analysing all three classes of private equity activity across Africa, we find the majority of 
foreign VC activity arising from international development agencies like IFC and their major 
OECD national counterparts; such as France’s Proparco, UK’s CDC, and Netherlands FMO. 5  
Domestic VC activity is overwhelmingly dominated by the indigenous North African private equity 
community where much of this is linked either to the state or to large extended family business 
groups. Finally, we find BA and domestic VC activity being largely reflective of the prosperity of 
national economies across the region; with North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco) alongside 
Nigeria, Botswana and South Africa all featuring prominently. 
 
4.  Data – African IPOs 
The dataset was constructed in two stages.  First, a list of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) on African 
markets between January 2000 and January 2014 was identified.  In North Africa these include 
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, and in SSA Cape Verde Islands (Bolsa de Valores de Cabo 
Verde), Cameroon (Bourse de Douala), BRVM (Cote d’Ivoire), Sierra Leone, Malawi, Kenya, 
Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Seychelles, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Mozambique, Mauritius and 
Ghana. Nigeria was also included but only data between January 2002 and January 2014 was 
available.  Our primary source was here the national stock exchanges and their associated websites 
and these were cross checked with lists sourced from major brokerage houses to ensure accuracy in 
the case of Nigeria and Zambia.  This resulted in an “estimated” population of 280 stock listings. 
 In order make sure our population actually covered IPOs and not private placements, the 
IPO prospectuses were obtained.  Our IPO data include only offerings that produce genuine 
                                                 
5
 These are omitted for brevity but available from authors upon request 
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diversification of ownership amongst a base of minority shareholders (as opposed to private 
placements involving the preferential allocation of stock with institutional or corporate block 
holders in pre-arranged quantities and prices). Equally care was taken to avoid misclassifications 
with registrations, introductions and seasoned (secondary) offerings as these are often also officially 
referred to as IPOs. Furthermore IPO’s are defined as offerings of ordinary shares with single class 
voting rights, that is, excluding preferred stock, convertibles, unit and investment trusts as well as 
readmissions, reorganizations and demergers and transfers of shares between main and development 
boards. In lieu of these efforts to focus solely on IPOs our final population is reduced to 202 
genuine IPO firms. 
Data on IPOs were collected from the financial market regulator websites for Algeria and 
Morocco while a combination of Thomson Corporation Perfect Information and Al Zawya 
databases were used for Egyptian prospectuses. The Al Zawya database, the national stock 
exchange and direct contact with individual firms, were used to source prospectuses for Tunisia.  
Similarly, in SSA, prospectuses were from the Ghanaian, Tanzanian, Cape Verdean, and Sierra 
Leone national stock exchanges and the exchange websites in the case of Seychelles and Cameroon.  
Thomson Corporation Perfect Information database was used in the first instance to source 
prospectuses from Nigeria, Malawi and Kenya. Pangea Stockbrokers (Zambia) as well as individual 
floated firms provided prospectuses for the Zambian stock market. Finally, in SSA, the African 
Financials website (African Financials website, 2014) provided information relevant to listing from 
annual reports. 
Considerable care was taken in the interpretation of information from IPO listings 
prospectuses given the considerable variation in size and quality of these filings across the continent.  
Examples range from inaccuracies in values and units of measurement in Egypt (such as units 
stipulated in prospectuses as billions where additional verification confirmed value denominated in 
millions) to omissions and inaccuracies in the balance sheets in the prospectuses of many smaller 
Nigerian firms.  Attempts to verify data from prospectuses with additional sources such as firm 
websites, annual reports and mandatory filings of annual accounts were taken wherever possible. 
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Finally it is notable that of our population of 202 genuine IPOs, 6 had missing values in 
terms of published age of IPO firm –resulting in the final sample6 of 196 IPOs.  The 6 missing 
observations are evenly distributed throughout the sample. 
 
5.  Methodology – variables and models 
5.1 Dependent variables 
We employ a binary dependent variable that takes the value 1 if the IPO firm, post-IPO, is 
constituent to a business group and 0 otherwise. Characterisation of IPO firms in being constituent 
to business groups was made through detailed analysis of individual listings prospectuses as well as 
the body of locally accumulated background information and sources outlined in Appendix Table 
1.7 Our use of such binary dummy variables follows research by Andersen et al (2003) where 
similar variables were employed to capture familial involvement in firms. A serious shortcoming in 
relying on formal ownership thresholds to define family involvement in firms “…is that some 
families are able to exert control with minimal fractional ownership, while others require larger 
stakes for the same level of control due to differences in firm size, industry, business practices, and 
product placement” (Andersen et al., 2003: 269). Furthermore there is evidence supporting the 
extended nature of traditional notions of African family – which are very different from their 
Western counterparts in being based on a much wider and more inclusive rubric (see Khavul et al., 
2009 for discussion). This even holds true for North African societies where these are feudal and 
clan-based in nature with extended familial groups at their core. The deeper cultural institutions are 
incongruous to the more equitable nature of primarily Islamic religious institutions although they 
are reinforced by ethical notions of morality. These constraints underscore our approach in placing 
emphasis on analysis of soft managerial control mechanisms as well as hard, formal ownership 
rights. 
                                                 
6
 A sample as a result of randomly distributed missing observations is justified. However, with only six observations 
missing our test will rather be one of seeing our “sample” as drawn from a “super population” of IPOs. 
7
 See Hearn & Piesse (2013) and Hearn (2014) for examples of elaborate extended African business group structures 
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Furthermore business groups’ use of unlisted firms and holding entities that are not subject 
to internationally recognized reporting standards (such as IFRS) – commonly enforced through 
formal stock exchange listing – infers considerable opacity. The lack of transparency severely 
hinders more accurate analysis of cross-shareholdings and pyramidal structures and underscores our 
focus on softer group-wide socialization measures prevalent such as director interlock and 
identification of individual family (and non-family) group members populating boards across the 
group. 
The employment of both formal (through “vertical” pyramidal and “horizontal” cross 
shareholdings) and informal (socialization) group affiliation circumvents thorny issues regarding 
the formal definition of family firms8. It also facilitates the tracing of more informal business 
groups too.  The complexity of analysing business group structure is exemplified in Figure 1. The 
Bank of Africa group was initially a group centred on Malian corporate interests prior to its 2008 
takeover by Morocco’s Benjelloun family. Here there is little, if any, direct ownership participation 
in group-constituent firms by the controlling family. However it is notable that there is a 
particularly high concentration of Benjelloun family members across boards of subordinate firms – 
engendering strong control through informal or “soft” means. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
It is also evident that the VC component of private equity investment across group-constituent firms 
emanates from two sources.  As earlier mentioned, these are foreign sources – primarily sovereign 
governments and development agencies – and within-group sources, where two VC entities, 
ATTICA and AGORA9 have already been absorbed into the business group. 
 
                                                 
8
 In particular where this is commonly based on a minimum ownership threshold. 
9
 ATTICA was established within the Bank of Africa group in October 2004 as a private equity investment vehicle.  
AGORA was established in 2002 as a specialised investment management entity that also engage in private equity 
investment across the wider group (Bank of Africa website, 2015) 
 18 
5.2 Explanatory variables 
We designate private equity retained ownership, the focus of our hypotheses, within the context of 
its three disaggregated components: namely the percentage level of retained post-IPO ownership by 
BA, domestic VC and foreign VC private equity investors, respectively.  All were sourced from in-
depth studies of IPO listings prospectuses providing data on pre- and post-IPO ownership structure 
including equity stakes of all investors. One way to measure the extent of retention is to use the 
ratio of the shares retained to the shares held before IPO. However, this may distort the 
hypothesized governance impact of retained equity in mitigating transactions costs since it does not 
differentiate between investors’ absolute shareholdings pre- and post an IPO. Therefore, we 
followed previous studies and used the percentage ratio of the total number of ordinary shares a 
particular early stage investor owned after the IPO to the total number of the firm’s shares after the 
IPO as a driver of incentives and/or entrenchment effects associated with share ownership (Bruton 
et al., 2010; Brennan & Franks, 1997; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Wright et al., 1997). 
 In order to enhance the robustness of our study, we employed a variety of resources to 
identify and confirm the VC and BA investors within focal IPO firms in our sample. Hence, we 
looked for further support in internet-based local media, stock exchange descriptions and regulatory 
filings.  These was also supplemented by analysis of web-based resources of Egyptian Private 
Equity Association (EPEA), the African Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, and the 
South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (SAVCA). 
The identification of BA investors is altogether more complex owing to the inherent lack of 
transparency in these often extremely informal markets.  As such we build our identification in line 
with that undertaken by Bruton et al. (2010) in their study of UK and France.  Consequently we 
identify BAs through the prospectus as those that had invested in the venture as private individuals 
apart from those associated with founders, other board members, senior management, or VC. We 
also supplemented our identification through the extensive use of internet-based access to local 
indigenous media to provide further verification (see Appendix Table 1). The use of local media 
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and business journal is essential in a region with BA markets notoriously informal in nature and 
with few, if any, organised associations of angel investors. 
 
5.3 Moderation variables 
We employ one institutionally-based measure, in conjunction with the three categories of private 
equity retained ownership, to form our moderating variables.  This is an aggregate institutional 
quality measure, formed from equally weighted average of six World Bank governance metrics 
(Kaufman et al., 2009) that themselves have been rebased to a 0 – 10 scale (see Liu et al., 2014 for 
details of institutional moderation using an index). The interactive institutional quality relates to 
Hypothesis 2. 
 
5.4 Control variables 
We incorporated six distinct sets of control variables. The first consists of institutional control 
variables and include a legal origin binary dummy (1/0) accounting for civil code law regime 
alongside an aggregate institutional quality index, comprised from equally weighted average of six 
underlying World Governance metrics (also used in the formation of the moderating variable). The 
inclusion of this aggregated quality index is necessitated through our interactive analysis using the 
methodology of Kim et al. (2004) and Liu et al., (2014). 
The second group consists of corporate governance control variables which are necessitated 
both through executive decision monitoring and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983) as well as through a 
resource dependence need for securing access to information and resources to ensure the survival of 
firm (Boyd, 1994; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  The latter perspective infers more non-executives in 
relation to their boundary-spanning abilities in providing access to valuable resources for the firm.  
Thus, we include controls for board size, in terms of total number of executive and nonexecutive 
directors, and an outsider non-executive ratio, defined as number of outside, independent and 
unaffiliated nonexecutives to board size. 
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 The third group consists of four firm-specific controls variables. In line with Sanders & 
Carpenter (1998) and Finkelstein & Boyd (1998) we use the natural logarithm of firm’s pre-tax 
revenues (or sales) as proxy for size assumed to control for the complexity of a given firm’s 
operations and thus mirroring complexity of the task environment which in turn is reflective of 
information processing requirements of the board. We adopt the accounting return on assets 
(ROA)10 as a measure of firm performance in line with Finkelstein & Boyd (1998) and Khanna & 
Palepu (2000). We also control for firm age where older firms are anticipated to have larger, more 
complex operations mirroring more complex task environments. The variable also controls for the 
“liability of newness” and the considerable information asymmetries generated by a lack of 
operational and performance history (Arthurs et al., 2008).  Finally, following Andersen et al (2003) 
we introduce the ratio of debt to equity as a control for financial leverage or gearing11. The variable 
captures the differential use of debt as opposed to equity as a governance mechanism as well as the 
degree and type of financing corresponding to where the firm is positioned in its lifecycle of 
development. This control variable also captures the degree of institutionalized religious prohibition 
of interest-based debt instruments, which is prevalent in Islamic shari’ya informal institutions 
(Kuran, 2004).  These are typically infused into firm’s organizational structure through family 
values that permeate the wider entity and thereby impact on financial structure and gearing 
(leverage). 
The fourth group encompasses ownership control variables. We account for concentrated 
shareholdings of aggregate board, corporate block entities, family and state. These are mechanisms 
                                                 
10
 ROA is conventionally defined as ROA = ((Net Income + Interest*(1 – Tax Rate))/ Total Assets) (see Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000).  However due to significant variation in the data arising from varying reporting standards across Africa 
with frequent omission of reported interest income and corporate taxation rates from listings prospectuses we use a 
modified version of this, namely ROA = (Net Income/ Total Assets).  However while both measures suffer from 
business cycle affects and are not forward looking they provide a representative indication of firm performance subject 
to the data limitations prevalent to emerging economies. 
11
 In contrast to Bruton et al. (2010) where the ratio of debt to assets was used, we use the debt-to-equity ratio.  Whilst 
this is vulnerable to variations between the static accounting valuation of equity as opposed to market-valuation and is 
vulnerable to business cycles it captures both the preferences for the use of debt, and importantly captures the degree 
debt is used in conjunction with it being a “rules-based” governance instrument limiting managerial discretion and 
mitigating potential agency conflicts. 
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by which these entities can exert significant coercive institutional pressures into the firm’s 
organizational structure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 The fifth group contains two IPO specific control variables. The first accounts for the 
demand for equity finance in terms of the demographic marketing of shares offered at IPO to types 
of investors.  The ratio of shares offered at IPO to foreign investors to total shares issued and 
outstanding post-IPO provides an indication of the willingness of the groups controlling business 
group to facilitate the coercive institutional pressures arising from active management processes of 
foreign investors into the organizational structure. The second accounts for the proportion of 
divestment by private equity entities over the IPO event. This is designated as the difference in 
aggregate private equity ownership between pre- and post-IPO periods divided by pre-IPO holdings. 
 Finally, we include one Economic control variable – the ratio of stock market capitalization 
to GDP.  We follow Judge et al (2015) who also undertake a cross-country comparative study and 
provides a measure of the relative importance of stock market financing in relation to overall size of 
economy. 
 
5.5 Empirical Model 
A primary consideration in our choice of empirical model is that of causality arising from 
endogeneity issues.  Endogeneity is a significant concern in relation to the linear unidirectional 
association and the expected causality between the dependent variables (likelihood of IPO firm 
being constituent to business group) and the retained ownership by private equity entities (BA, 
domestic and foreign VC). This renders the simple assumption of linear causality unreliable with 
Probit or logistic model potentially overestimating the importance of these ownership variables 
(Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003) in explaining the likelihood of the outcome. Consequently we follow 
Bruton et al. (2010) in adjusting for potential endogeniety between dependent and explanatory 
independent variables by applying an initial estimation step, using OLS, with exogenous 
instruments included on top of all controls used in main parts of analysis. Given the incompatibility 
of errors between preliminary OLS and second stage Probit models, we adopt the IV-Probit model 
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with two-stage Newey (1987) estimation format. The exogenous variables selected are the numbers 
of each category of private equity involved in each respective IPO, i.e. the numbers of BA in 
regression with dependent variable of BA retained ownership, then the numbers of domestic VC 
entities with dependent variable as domestic VC retained ownership, then finally the numbers of 
foreign VC entities with dependent variable as foreign VC retained ownership. 
Our empirical Instrumental Variable Probit (IV-Probit) model is estimated through two 
distinct steps as outlined by Newey (1987). Given that one or more regressors are correlated with 
error term, we use the IV Probit model instead of a conventional single step Probit model. The 
Newey (1987) two-stage estimation process involves OLS as our first step before proceeding with 














       (1) 
 
where i = 1, ……N, y2i is a 1 x p vector of endogenous variables, x1i is a 1 x k1 vector of exogenous 
variables, x2i is a 1 x k2 vector of additional instruments, and the equation for y2i is written in reduced 
form.  By assumption, ( iu , i ) ~ ),0( N , where σ11 is normalized to one to identify the model.   
and   are vectors of structural parameters, and 1  and 2  are matrices of reduced-form 
parameters. This is a recursive model:  iy2  appears in the equation for 
*
1iy , but 
*
1iy  does not appear 
in the equation for iy2 .  We do not observe 
*
1iy  - instead, we observe: 
 









y         (2) 
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The order condition for identification of structural parameters requires that k2 > p. Furthermore the 
model is derived under the assumption that ( iu , i ) is independent and identically distributed 
multivariate normal for all i. It is worth noting that the parameter estimates derived from Newey 
(1987) two-step procedure are not directly comparable to those obtained from maximum likelihood 
methods that underscore probit modelling. However, the two-step method is generally more robust 
in achieving convergence in the context of multiple endogenous variables – as is the case here with 
three types of private equity retained ownership (see Wooldridge, 2010 for discussion of two-step 
estimators). 
 In practice OLS regressions starts with a run between endogenous variables and instruments 
– where these include all exogenous variables too. There are only as many first step OLS 
regressions as there are distinct endogenous variables – for which appropriate orthogonal 
instruments should be identified and included alongside exogenous variables. The errors from this 
first step are then included in the second IV-Probit model – including representations of endogenous 
variables alongside exogenous variables. 
 Two Wald test statistics are reported. The first related to the null hypothesis that all 
parameter coefficients of model(s) are jointly equal to zero, with the test statistic distributed as a χ2 
(chi-square) distribution. The second focuses on the null hypothesis that i  in first step OLS model 
are equal to zero and is again distributed as a χ2 distribution. If these null hypotheses are rejected 
then covariates are indeed exogenous while the overall model is of significance in its prediction 
capacity i.e. the Wald statistic can be viewed as a means of discriminating between rival IV-Probit 
models. 
 We test two sets of IV-Probit models – relating to each of our two hypotheses in turn. The 
first simply tests the likelihood of the three private equity categories (BA, domestic and foreign VC) 
retained ownership as endogenous variables in influencing the likelihood of IPO firm being 
constituent to a business group. We use the numbers of BA, domestic VC and foreign VC 
respectively as three orthogonal instrumental variables. Our various categories of controls form the 
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exogenous variables in addition to industry and time fixed effects. Three preliminary OLS 
regressions are run with dependent variable in each case being the private equity ownership. In each 
regression all three instrumental variables are included alongside each other – namely the numbers 
of BA, domestic VC and foreign VC respectively in addition to exogenous controls. 
The second stage involves the final conditional probit modelling with the dependent variable 
being the binary (1/0) likelihood of IPO firm being constituent to business group. Independent 
variables are then estimates of the three private equity ownership categories on top of exogenous 
controls. Differences between countries (institutional environments) are accounted for with the 
institutional quality controls. Additional country fixed effects are not used so as to avoid the dummy 
variable trap (Wooldridge, 2009)12. However, industry and time (year) fixed effects are applied 
across all models.  Industry controls capture diversification differences – a key feature in business 
groups (Khanna & Palepu, 2000) while year effects relate to variation in institutional development 
and improvements in regulations, capital market culture, and surveillance environment. The 
industry definitions vary across each country (see Khanna & Rivkin, 2001 for details of similar 
issues in a comparable study of 14 emerging economies) leading us to adopt Bloomberg basic 
industry definitions13. 
The test of our second hypothesis considers the moderating impact of institutional quality on 
the association between retained ownership and the dependent variable of business group affiliation. 
The test involves six preliminary OLS regressions with dependent in each case being each of the 
three private equity retained ownership and then a further three interactive variables formed from 
each of the three private equity ownership categories moderated by institutional quality. Instruments 
are again the three respective numbers of BA, domestic VC and foreign VC but in this second set of 
                                                 
12
 If dummy variables for all country (and time) categories were included, their sum would equal 1 for all observations, 
which is identical to and hence perfectly correlated with the vector-of-ones variable whose coefficient is the constant 
term; if the vector-of-ones variable were also present, this would result in perfect multicollinearity, so that the matrix 
inversion in the estimation algorithm would be impossible. This is referred to as the dummy variable trap (Wooldridge, 
2009) 
13
 Industry classifications are:  Basic Materials; Consumer Goods Non-Cyclical; Consumer Goods Cyclical; Energy; 
Financials; Health; Industrials; Technology; Telecommunications; Utilities.  The identification of firms according to 
their industry using broad Bloomberg definitions is in keeping with data limitations across our sample, which is a 
prevalent characteristic of emerging economies. 
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models these are additionally moderated by institutional quality – giving rise to six instruments (the 
three underlying private equity counts on top of three more variables formed from the moderation 
of these with institutional quality). As with our first set, these first regressions form the conditional 
parameters in second stage IV-Probit model. Here again the dependent variable is the binary (1/0) 
likelihood of whether IPO firm is constituent to business group. Coefficient statistical significance 
is assessed with one-tailed cumulative normal distribution. 
 
6.  Empirical results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
The correlation patterns outlined in Table 3 indicate no multi-collinearity problems. This 
observation is also confirmed by the unproblematic variance inflation factors (not reported).  
Furthermore, the correlations between the instruments (numbers of BA, domestic VC and foreign 
VC) and the dependent variables are both small in absolute value and either lacking or at best with 
minimal statistical significance, whereas the correlations between the instruments and the 
potentially endogenous explanatory variables (i.e. ownership of BA, domestic VC and foreign VC) 
are strongly significant (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). Following Bruton et al (2010) our choice of 
instruments to account for endogeneity is supported by their high correlation with each of the 
respective private equity categories of retained ownership while they have minimal correlation with 
all other variables. 
 
Insert Table 3 
6.2 Multivariate analysis 
Table 4 provides the results of the hypothesis tests as the result from the second stage of the IV-
Probit models 14 . The empirical evidence broadly supports both our proposed hypotheses. We 
observe a positive association with all categories of private equity retained ownership and the 
likelihood of an IPO firm being constituent to a business group, as proposed in Hypothesis 1 (see 
                                                 
14
 The results from the first preliminary OLS steps are available from authors upon request 
 26 
Table 4, models 1 and 2).  Furthermore this association is negatively moderated by institutional 
quality, as proposed in Hypothesis 2 (see Table 4, models 3 and 4), although this is weaker in the 
case of aggregate private equity (p ≤ 0.10), while moderation attains considerable significance for 
foreign VC (p ≤ 0.05) and to a lesser extent with BA (p ≤ 0.10) in line with our theoretical 
expectations. 
 In terms of controls and the likelihood of an IPO firm being constituent to a business group, 
we find an association with weaker institutional environments (p ≤ 0.05), larger firms with more 
complex operations (in terms of natural log of revenues) (p ≤ 0.05), and younger firms (p ≤ 0.05).  
The dependent variable is also associated with much higher ownership by family members (p ≤ 
0.005).  Finally we find a weak association between dependent variable and the ratio of stock 
market capitalization to GDP (p ≤ 0.01). 
 Finally, the Wald tests for exogeneity across all models are large suggesting our models are 
robust.  The underlying model (models 1 and 2) only testing the association between retained 
ownership of private equity and dependent variable have Wald statistics of 46.73 (p ≤ 0.05) and 
52.14 (p ≤ 0.10) with respect to a χ2 distribution while that for the moderating models (models 3 and 
4) have Wald statistics of 46.82 (p ≤ 0.05) and 44.72 (p ≤ 0.10).  This provides further statistical 
support for our choice of instruments – with these being the respective numbers of each category of 
private equity, namely BA, domestic and foreign VC.  The Wald statistic for overall model too is 
large and statistically significant (p ≤ 0.05) inferring the null hypothesis of all coefficient 
parameters being jointly equal to zero is clearly rejected. 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
Finally, using the model parameters we input a range of values for private equity retained 
ownership post-IPO and institutional quality to produce a 3-dimensional probability surface with 
respect to likelihood of IPO firm being constituent to a business group.  This is outlined in Figure 2.  
Here there is a particularly pronounced increase in statistical likelihood of IPO firm being 
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constituent to a business group in the context of lower institutional quality and increasing private 
equity retained ownership. 
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
7.  Discussion and conclusions 
7.1 Implications and Contributions 
Using a comprehensive sample of 202 IPO’s undertaken across Africa between January 2000 and 
January 2014, we find evidence that a combination of institutional quality and the post-IPO private 
equity retained ownership explain whether or not IPO firms are constituent to business groups. The 
retained ownership of private equity constitutes a corporate governance mechanism centered on 
intrusive and/or close relationship with the investee firm post-IPO. This investor-investee 
relationship typically includes board participation, voting control and frequent meetings with 
executives. The alternative is a divestment or an exit from focal firm at IPO and the use of legally 
mandated performance covenants and contractual terms.  
We argue that private equity retain a higher ownership share post-IPO in business group 
constituent firms than in independent firms owing to substantial transactions costs arising from 
differences in the bounded rationality of the two entities.  These transaction costs arise from the 
institutional environment shaping private equity managers and separately the institutional fabric 
underlying group formation and cohesion. The transactions costs are conceptually closely related to 
moral hazard costs associated with traditional agency theory (e.g. Williamson, 1998, 2000).  
Furthermore, we find that post-IPO involvement by private equity investee firms is negatively 
moderated by institutional quality in general.  These findings contradict the common agency theory 
driven arguments (e.g. Bruton et al., 2010), and highlight how the conduct of African business is 
more in line with the socially contextualized actor-centered institutional perspective developed in 
Section 2. 
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 Following Bruton et al (2010) we empirically differentiate between BA and VC investors. 
The former being “informal” and investing their own capital – often with a background as 
successful entrepreneurs themselves – while the latter are “formal” and either investing funds raised 
from their own external investors or on behalf of commercial bank or sovereign development 
agencies. We also follow Bruton et al (2005) in further differentiating between “foreign” and 
“domestic” VC with this distinction centring on the degree to which entities are inextricably 
socially embedded within the indigenous political economy. In particular we argue that - despite 
these differences between BA and VC and separately between foreign and domestic VC as 
highlighted in Bruton et al (2010)’s comparative study of UK and French IPO firms - all private 
equity investors are faced with the same risks in engaging with business group constituents.  This 
communality between all three categories of private equity in terms of risk – are reflected in 
differences in bounded rationality of all three private equity on the one hand and business groups on 
the other. In particular private equity generally lack the deeper sociologically-rooted cohesive 
institutional framework – often based on a combination of familial and clan altruism – that is so 
ubiquitous to business groups. This is a particularly important issue given the highly socialized 
nature of the extended managerial resource coordination system that forms the basis for internal 
capital, product and labour markets within business groups – where these are viewed as a central 
strategic advantage under “institutional voids” arguments rationalizing their formation (see Khanna 
& Rivkin, 2001). We argue that this socialized coordination mechanism is a reflection of deeper 
sociological structures within the indigenous societal matrix necessitating an intrusive social 
presence inferred by higher retained ownership by private equity in order to mitigate informational 
asymmetries and transactions costs associated with moral hazard. 
 The developed actor-centered institutional perspective builds on the premise that enhanced 
formal institutions arise from a combination of coercive and mimetic pressures that seeks to 
instigate public sector (state) reform. In the African context such pressures have led to the 
establishment of new stock markets, more corporate transparency and other economic reforms 
(Ashworth et al., 2007).  However, this wholesale transplantation of economic policies infers a lack 
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of cognitive legitimacy with deeper societal and culturally-based organizational forms – such as 
indigenous business groups.  In line with past research, we argue that African business groups 
evolve in relation to deeper sociological issues within society, specifically benefitting from the 
property rights protection and enforcement bestowed on constituent members from the group 
structure. Thus, business groups in Africa in effect create a form of “sub-state” hybrid governance 
organization that often exists in tandem with well-designed and functioning external state apparatus. 
 African business groups that are able to draw on their reputational leverage to attract private 
equity can thereby augment otherwise limited internal capital markets with additional infusions of 
capital.  Our findings reveal that higher institutional quality inversely moderates the association 
between private equity ownership – and in particular that of foreign VC and to lesser extent BA – 
and the likelihood that the focal firm is constituent to a business group.  We argue that this is a 
reflection of foreign VC in particular being more influenced by professional industry norms shaped 
on dominant US private equity industry. Here there is a greater reliance on institutional quality in 
order to alleviate monitoring costs and to enable effective sanctions on expropriating insiders of 
investee firms. Furthermore these norms are rooted on market-based forms of governance – 
including notions of divestment and exit at IPO – which are very different from the relationship-
orientation inherent in indigenous clan-based and tribal societies from within which business groups 
are embedded.  Thus in the context of higher institutional quality foreign VC in particular are more 
likely to adhere to US based industry norms and either divest at IPO or to seek other investment 
alternatives with less expropriation risk as those associated with business groups.  The opposite is 
true in low institutional quality environments where norms are shaped by relationship-orientated 
governance emphasizing continuity, trust and reputation as a means of alleviating risks. 
 To sum up, our empirical findings question the conventional view of organizations as mere 
“players” within the confines of the “rules of the game” inferred by institutions (Williamson, 1998, 
2000).  What we observe in the interplay between private equity and African business groups, is 
that group-constituent IPO firms adopt a “sub-state” role in defining property rights.  We argue that 
consideration of the socialized managerial resource coordination mechanism within business groups 
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has been largely overlooked in the emerging market literature to date.  This is despite its central 
importance to the well documented strategic benefits of business groups arising from their internal 
capital, labor and product markets that is at the core of “institutional voids” arguments regarding 
their formation. 
 
7.2 Limitations and Future Research 
While our study is using a multi-country institutional framework and we use an aggregate 
institutional quality measure based on the six well-known World Bank governance metrics – a more 
revealing approach would be if disaggregation were possible.  Such disaggregation is fraught with 
issues regarding the independence of the six World Bank governance metrics (see Langbein & 
Knack, 2010).  One possibility is the employment of a broader range of institutional metrics that 
could potentially facilitate deeper insights into the exact nature of institutional deficiencies and the 
rationale for business group formation.   
A further limitation arises from our sample formed by IPOs only. While IPO events provide 
a number of methodological advantages and is a central part of our natural experiment, in the sense 
that such firms are opening their organizational and ownership structures, a broader sample 
comprised of every listed firm would have been advantageous.  Finally, we highlight the need for 
broader cross-country comparative studies in order to further “tease out” the institutional contexts 
and differences leading to the prevalence of business groups in emerging markets in general, and in 
Africa in particular. 
 31 
References 
African Financials website. 2014. African Financial Statements and Annual Reports. 
http://www.africanfinancials.com/ Accessed 15 September 2014 
Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. (2003).  The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: 
Dimensions and determinants. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 447-465 
Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. (2010).  Comparative and international corporate governance.  The 
Academy of Management Annals, 4(1), 485-556 
Aoki, M. (2001). Toward a comparative institutional analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Ashworth, R., Boyne, G., & Delbridge, R. (2007).  Escape from the iron cage? Organizational 
change and isomorphic pressures in the public sector. Journal of Public Administration 
Research, 19, 165-187 
Arthurs, J., Hoskisson, R., Busenitz, L., & Johnson, R. (2008).  Managerial agents watching other 
agents: multiple agency conflicts regarding underpricing in IPO firms. Academy of 
Management Journal, 51: 277–294 
Bank of Africa website (2015).  Bank of Africa: Groupe BMCE Banque. http://www.bank-of-
africa.net/en Accessed 15 August 2015 
Barry, C. B., Muscarella, C. J., Peavy III, J. W., & Vetsuypens, M. R. 1990.  The role of venture 
capital in the creation of public companies. Journal of Financial Economics, 27: 447-471 
Boyd, B. K. 1994.  Board control and CEO compensation. Strategic Management Journal, 15(5): 
335-344 
Bruton, G. D., Fried, V. H. & Manigart, S. (2005).  Institutional influences on the worldwide 
expansion of Venture Capital. Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice, 29(6): 737 – 760 
Bruton, G. D., Filatotchev, I., Chahine, S., & Wright, M. (2010).  Governance, ownership structure, 
and performance of IPO firms: The impact of different types of private equity investors and 
institutional environments.  Strategic Management Journal, 31: 491-509 
 32 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. H. & Lang, L. H. P. (1999).  Expropriation of Minority 
Shareholders. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, WPS 2088. World Bank: 
Washington. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S. & Lang, L. H. P. (2000).  The separation of ownership and control in 
East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58: 81-112 
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983).  The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147-160 
Finkelstein, S., & Boyd, B. K. (1998).  How much does the CEO matter? The role of managerial 
discretion in the setting of CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 179-
199 
Gompers, P., & Lerner, J. (1996).  The use of covenants: An empirical analysis of venture 
partnership agreements. Journal of Law and Economics, 39(2), 463-498 
Granovetter, M. (2005).  Business groups and social organization.  In The Handbook of Economic 
Sociology, Second Edition, ed. N. Smelser and R. Swedberg. Princeton University Press, 
429-50 
Hamilton, B., & Nickerson, J. (2003).  Correcting for endogeneity in strategic management research. 
Strategic Organization, 1: 53-80 
Hearn, B., & Piesse, J. (2013).  Firm level governance and institutional determinants of liquidity:  
Evidence from Sub Saharan Africa. International Review of Financial Analysis, 28: 93-111 
Hearn, B. (2014).  The political institutional and firm governance determinants of liquidity: 
Evidence from North Africa and the Arab Spring. Journal of International Financial Markets, 
Institutions & Money, 31: 127-158 
Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., Johnson, R. A. & Grossman, W. (2002).  Conflicting voices: the 
effects of institutional ownership heterogeneity and internal governance on corporate 
innovation strategies. The Academy of Management Journal, 45(4), 697-716 
 33 
Hoskisson, R. E., Yiu, D., & Kim, H. (2004).  Corporate governance systems: Effects of capital and 
labour market congruency on corporate innovation and global competitiveness. Journal of 
High Technology, 15, 293-315 
Judge, W. Q., Witt, M. A., Zattoni, A., Talaulicar, T., Chen, J. J., Lewellyn, K., Hu H. W., Shukla, 
D., Bell, R. G., Gabrielsson, J., Lopez, F., Yamak, S., Fassin, Y., McCarthy, D., Rivas, J. L., 
Fainshmidt, S., & Van Ees, H. (2015). Corporate governance and IPO underpricing in a 
cross-national sample: A multilevel knowledge-based view. Strategic Management Journal, 
36, 1174–1185 
Kaufman, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2009).  Governance Matters VIII: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2008. World Bank Policy Research Unit, June 2009 
Kim, H., Hoskisson, R., & Wan, W. (2004).  Power dependence, diversification strategy, and 
performance in keiretsu member firms. Strategic Management Journal, 25(7): 613-636 
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. (2000).  Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis 
of diversified Indian business groups. Journal of Finance, 55(2): 867-891 
Khanna, T., & Rivkin, J. W. (2001).  Estimating the performance effects of business groups in 
emerging markets. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 45-74 
Khanna, T., & Yafeh, Y. (2007).  Business groups in emerging markets: Paragons or Parasites? 
Journal of Economic Literature, 45(2): 331-372 
Khavul, S., Bruton, G. D., & Wood, E. (2009).  Informal family business in Africa. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(6): 1219-1238 
Kuran, T. (2004).  Why the Middle East is economically underdeveloped: historical mechanisms of 
institutional stagnation. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(3): 71-90. 
Langbein, L., & Knack, S. (2010).  The Worldwide governance indicators: Six, One, or None? 
Journal of Development Studies, 46(2), 350-370 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Schliefer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997).  Legal Determinants of 
External Finance.  Journal of Finance, 52: 1131-1150 
 34 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Schliefer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998).  Law and Finance. Journal 
of Political Economy, 106(6): 1113-1155 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 1999.  Corporate ownership around the World,  
Journal of Finance, 54: 471-518 
Lerner, J. (1994).  Venture capitalists and the decision to go public. Journal of Financial Economics, 
35: 293-316 
Levy, J. D. (2008). From the dirigiste state to the social anaesthsia state: French economic policy in 
the longue duree. Modern & Contemporary France, 16(4), 417-435 
Liu, X., Lu, J., & Chizema, A. (2014).  Top executive compensation, regional institutions and 
Chinese OFDI. Journal of World Business, 49: 143-155 
Newey, W. K. (1987). Efficient estimation of limited dependent variable models with endogenous 
explanatory variables.  Journal of Econometrics 36: 231–250 
North, D. C. (1990).  A transaction cost theory of politics. Journal of Theoretical Politics 2, 355-
367. 
North, D. C. (1994).  The historical evolution of polities. International Review of Law and 
Economics 14, 381-391. 
Nunn, N., Wantchekon, L. (2011). The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in Africa. American 
Economic Review 101(7), 3221-3252. 
Milgrom, P. R., & Roberts, J. (1994). Complementarities and systems: Understanding Japanese 
economic organization. Estudios Economicos, 9(1), 3-42 
Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance: The Reliance on Rules of 
CEO Succession. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44 (2), 384–416 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978).  The external control of organizations: A resource-dependence 
perspective. New York: Harper & Row 
Randøy, T. & Goel, S. (2003). Ownership Structure, Founding Family Leadership, and Performance 
in Norwegian SMEs. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(5): 619-637 
 35 
Sahlman, W. A. (1990).  The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 27, 473-521 
Sanders, W. M. G., & Carpenter, M. A. (1998).  Internationalization and firm governance: The roles 
of CEO compensation, top team composition and board structure. Academy of Management 
Journal, 41(2): 158-178 
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. (2003).  Toward a theory of agency and altruism in 
family firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 18: 473-490 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. 1997.  A survey of corporate governance.  Journal of Finance, 52(2): 
737-783 
Kuran, T. (2009). Explaining the Economic Trajectories of Civilizations: The Systemic Approach. 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 71, 593-605 
Transparency International. (2014). Corruption perceptions index.  http://www.transparency.org/  
Accessed 15 September 2014 
Williamson, O. E. (1998).  The institutions of governance. American Economic Review, 88(2): 75-
79 
Williamson, O. E. (2000).  The new institutional economics: Taking stock, looking ahead. Journal 
of Economic Literature, 38(3): 595-613 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2009).  Introductory econometrics: a modern approach. Cengage Learning. p. 
865. ISBN 0-324-58162-9 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data . 2nd ed. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
World Bank Governance indicators. (2014). World Bank Governance Indicators. 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp Accessed 15 September 2014 
 
 36 
Table 1. African IPO equity market characteristics for sample period January 2000 to January 2014 
This table outlines the total number (N) of IPOs undertaken in each country across Africa between January 2000 and January 2014 alongside a breakdown of how many of 
these are state privatizations, i.e. involve the state, and then involve business groups – where these are sub-categorized into family and non-family business groups.  For these 
two sub-categories, namely family and non-family, a further breakdown is provided indicating how many of each that additionally involve foreign VC and domestic VC and 
BA.  Finally we also present the percentage aggregate institutional quality per country. This is based on the equally weighted average of the six individual institutional quality 
indices developed by Kaufman et al (2009) across all markets with these having been rescaled on a 0-1 scale.  Compiled by authors from IPO listings prospectuses 
Market N  Aggregate 
Institution 
quality 
                                                     Number (#) of IPOs with the below categories of ownership and control per market 
  State                                                                                               Business Groups 
   Overall                               Non-Family                                      Family 
   Overall VC Foreign VC Domestic BA  Overall VC Foreign VC Domestic BA 
  
 %  #  # # # # #  # # # # 
North Africa                 
Algeria 4  28.9  3  1 …. …. …. ….  1 …. …. …. 
Egypt 10  42.4  3  3 …. …. …. ….  3 2 3 …. 
Morocco 39  46.9  2  22 5 2 3 ….  17 3 6 1 
Tunisia 33  50.8  2  17 3 2 …. 2  14 2 4 1 
East Africa                 
Kenya 10  40.0  4  1 1 1 …. ….  …. …. …. …. 
Mauritius 3  71.5  0  1 …. …. …. ….  1 1 1 …. 
Seychelles 1  57.0  1  0 …. …. …. ….  …. …. …. …. 
Tanzania 9  45.3  7  0 …. …. …. ….  …. …. …. …. 
Rwanda 2  47.9  2  0 …. …. …. ….  …. …. …. …. 
Uganda 6  38.5  4  0 …. …. …. ….  …. …. …. …. 
West Africa                 
Nigeria 26  29.5  0  10 2 2 …. ….  8 3 1 1 
BVRM 7  41.6  3  4 2 1 …. 2  2 …. …. 2 
Ghana 16  53.5  4  2 1 1 1 1  1 …. …. …. 
Cameroon 2  35.9  2  0 …. …. …. ….  …. …. …. …. 
Cape Verde 4  60.8  2  0 …. …. …. ….  …. …. …. …. 
Sierra Leone 2  38.5  1  0 …. …. …. ….  …. …. …. …. 
Southern Africa                 
Botswana 7  69.2  1  2 2 …. …. ….  …. …. …. …. 
Malawi 4  45.8  2  2 2 …. …. 1  …. …. …. …. 
Zambia 6  45.0  4  0 …. …. …. ….  …. …. …. …. 
Namibia 2  61.8  0  0 …. …. …. ….  …. …. …. …. 
Mozambique 2  47.1  2  0 …. …. …. ….  …. …. …. …. 
South Africa 7  61.3  1  0 …. …. …. ….  …. …. …. …. 
                 
Overall 202  46.5  51  65 20 9 4 8  45 11 15 3 
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Table 2. Private equity active management and ownership in business groups 
Table providing characteristics of the three main types of private equity investment (foreign versus domestic venture 
capital and business angels) in IPO firms that are constituent to business groups; Compiled by authors from IPO listings 
prospectuses. 
 
 Business Group 
 
Foreign VC Domestic VC Business Angel 
Panel 1: Monitoring characteristics    
Number of IPO firms with PE 11 19 21 
    
Number of PE-backed IPOs that are syndicates 7 10 8 
Average number of PE in syndicate 3.16 3.60 2.38 
    
Average PE shareholding post-IPO (%) 6.22 5.01 5.17 
    
Number full exits 1 1 0 
Number unchanged (no divestment) 3 6 7 
    
Panel 2: Private equity characteristics    
State/ Development Agency (%) 72.00 29.55 …. 
Firm/ Stand-Alone Agency (%)   4.00 52.27 …. 
Fund (%) 16.00   6.82 …. 
Bank (%)   8.00 11.36 …. 
Individual (%) …. …. 100.00 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 
    
Panel 3: Target firm characteristics    
Proportion target firms in North Africa (%) 28.00 88.64 56.67 
Proportion target firms in Sub Saharan Africa (%) 72.00* 11.36 43.33 
    
Target Industry: Telecommunications (%) 8.00 6.67 10.00 
Target Industry: Financials (%) 80.00 22.22 40.00 
Target Industry: Energy (%) …. …. …. 
Target Industry: Technology (%) …. 8.89 3.33 
Target Industry: Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods (%) …. …. …. 
Target Industry: Cyclical Consumer Goods (%) 12.00 40.00 23.33 
Target Industry: Healthcare (%) …. 2.22 6.67 
Target Industry: Industrials (%) …. 20.00 16.67 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Note:  *The overwhelming majority of firms in Sub Saharan African region targeted by foreign VC are constituent to 
the Bank of Africa group which ultimately forms the business group of Morocco’s Benjelloun family 
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Table 3. Correlations 
This table reports the Pearson correlations between all variables included in our study.  These are defined in section 5. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Business Group 1.000           
2 BA ownership 0.248*** 1.000          
3 Dom VC ownership 0.029 0.055 1.000         
4 Foreign VC ownership 0.007 0.049 -0.074 1.000        
5 Legal Origin 0.288*** 0.039 0.124† -0.061 1.000       
6 Institutional Quality -0.047 -0.072 0.094 0.038 0.156* 1.000      
7 Board Size 0.098 0.035 0.117† 0.054 0.258*** -0.086 1.000     
8 Independent Nonexecutive Ratio -0.162* 0.002 0.039 0.013 -0.230*** 0.190** -0.305*** 1.000    
9 Log (Revenues) 0.052 -0.102 -0.076 -0.037 0.027 0.007 0.231*** 0.122† 1.000   
10 ROA -0.073 -0.063 -0.062 -0.034 -0.057 0.099 -0.125† 0.106 0.038 1.000  
11 Log (Firm Age) 0.013 -0.008 -0.091 0.120† 0.071 -0.097 0.133† -0.050 0.233*** -0.038 1.000 
12 Debt-Equity Ratio -0.049 -0.034 0.290*** -0.013 -0.069 -0.074 -0.065 0.059 -0.018 -0.013 -0.043 
13 Executive ownership post-IPO -0.159* 0.058 -0.052 -0.060 -0.094 0.087 -0.232*** 0.069 -0.152* 0.020 -0.208*** 
14 Corporate Block ownership post-IPO -0.030 -0.054 -0.053 0.011 -0.067 0.209*** -0.036 0.216*** 0.022 -0.039 -0.046 
15 Family ownership post-IPO 0.500 0.085 0.008 -0.112 0.412*** 0.022 0.009 -0.201*** 0.010 -0.002 0.049 
16 State ownership post-IPO -0.208*** -0.167* -0.082 -0.078 0.083 -0.037 0.215*** -0.167* 0.149* -0.069 0.117 
17 Shares Offered to Foreign Investor to 
Total shares -0.156* -0.011 0.023 -0.054 -0.314*** 0.013 -0.024 0.129† -0.160* 0.025 -0.156* 
18 Change in PE ownership over IPO 0.079 0.125† 0.107 0.097 0.162* -0.074 -0.013 -0.073 -0.061 -0.015 0.010 
19 Ratio stock market capitalization to 
GDP 0.081 0.049 0.195† -0.092 0.118† 0.160* 0.253*** 0.070 0.297*** -0.044 0.117 
20 # BA 0.184** 0.786*** 0.036 0.044 0.123† -0.033 -0.043 0.042 -0.081 -0.063 -0.029 
21 # Domestic VC 0.135† 0.033 0.736*** -0.065 0.208*** 0.104 0.165* -0.034 -0.011 -0.081 -0.117 
22 # Foreign VC 0.110 0.137† -0.064 0.831*** 0.004 0.041 0.120† -0.033 -0.016 -0.034 0.058 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.005 
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Table 3. Correlations – continued 
 
  12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1 Business Group            
2 BA ownership            
3 Dom VC ownership            
4 Foreign VC ownership            
5 Legal Origin            
6 Institutional Quality            
7 Board Size            
8 Independent Nonexecutive Ratio            
9 Log (Revenues)            
10 ROA            
11 Log (Firm Age)            
12 Debt-Equity Ratio 1.000           
13 Executive ownership post-IPO -0.001 1.000          
14 Corporate Block ownership post-IPO -0.009 -0.121† 1.000         
15 Family ownership post-IPO -0.063 -0.070 -0.245*** 1.000        
16 State ownership post-IPO -0.046 -0.233*** -0.138† -0.331*** 1.000       
17 Shares Offered to Foreign Investor to Total 
shares -0.001 0.088 -0.024 -0.190** -0.067 1.000      
18 Change in PE ownership over IPO -0.030 0.077 -0.130† 0.107 -0.119† 0.033 1.000     
19 Ratio stock market capitalization to GDP -0.018 0.051 0.115 0.213*** -0.131† -0.058 0.075 1.000    
20 # BA -0.035 0.074 -0.079 0.111 -0.151** 0.001 0.249*** 0.051 1.000   
21 # Domestic VC 0.163* -0.090 -0.040 0.125† -0.037 -0.093 0.095 0.240*** 0.06 1.000  
22 # Foreign VC -0.007 -0.049 0.012 -0.074 -0.091 -0.116† 0.108 -0.114 0.153* -0.079 1.000 




Table 4.  Private equity board monitoring and ownership determinants of likelihood of business 
group affiliationa, b 
This table reports results from the second stage results from two-stage probit regressions for the binary (1/0) 
likelihood of IPO firm being constituent to a business group onto our explanatory variables with these being defined 
in section 5. 
 
 Likelihood of IPO firm constituent of Business Group 
 Underlying Underlying Institutions Institutions 
 IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -5.125 [-0.01] -5.057 [-0.01] -5.614 [-0.02] -18.960 [-0.05] 
Moderating variables:     
PE ownership 
 x Institutional Quality -- -- -- -- -0.243 [-1.45]† -- -- 
BA ownership 
 x Institutional Quality -- -- -- -- -- -- -2.432 [-1.53]† 
Domestic VC ownership 
 x Institutional Quality -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.252 [-0.29] 
Foreign VC ownership 
 x Institutional Quality -- -- -- -- -- -- -1.574 [-2.00]* 
Explanatory variables     
PE ownership 0.062 [2.87]** -- -- 0.182 [2.11]* -- -- 
BA ownership -- -- 0.088 [1.69]* -- -- 1.254 [1.69]* 
Domestic VC ownership -- -- 0.086 [2.07]* -- -- 0.222 [0.50] 
Foreign VC ownership -- -- 0.079 [2.43] † -- -- 0.978 [2.26]* 
Institutional Controls     
Civil Code Law (Legal Origin) 0.498 [1.21] 0.636 [1.23] 0.369 [0.85] -0.341 [-0.33] 
Institutional Quality -3.743 [-2.27]* -4.503 [-2.23]* -1.945 [-0.94] -2.843 [-0.61] 
Corporate governance controls     
Board Size -0.641 [-0.59] -0.619 [-0.45] -0.561 [-0.50] 1.891 [0.71] 
Outsider Nonexecutive Ratio -1.504 [-1.84]* -1.395 [-1.36]* -1.748 [-2.04]* -1.585 [-0.84] 
Firm-specific controls     
Log (Revenues) 0.621 [2.59]** 0.756 [2.51]** 0.668 [2.74]** 0.719 [1.31]† 
ROA -0.062 [-0.07] -0.058 [-0.05] -0.199 [-0.18] -1.221 [-0.44] 
Log (Firm Age) -0.740 [-1.81]* -0.807 [-1.59]† -0.591 [-1.40]† -0.766 [-0.75] 
Debt-Equity Ratio -0.045 [-0.81] -0.065 [-1.00] -0.05 [-0.88] -0.121 [-1.43]* 
Ownership controls     
Executive ownership post-IPO -0.011 [-1.15] -0.014 [-1.15] -0.011 [-1.15] -0.009 [-0.42] 
Corporate Block ownership post-IPO 0.013 [1.04] 0.012 [0.80] 0.013 [1.04] 0.021 [0.70] 
Family ownership post-IPO 0.036 [4.50]*** 0.045 [4.56]*** 0.035 [4.36]*** 0.058 [3.12]† 
State ownership post-IPO -0.003 [-0.31] -0.007 [-0.58] -0.005 [-0.45] -0.006 [-0.30] 
IPO control     
Shares Offered to Foreign Investors to 
Total Shares -0.007 [-0.01] 0.120 [0.15] -0.072 [-0.10] -0.744 [-0.43] 
Change in PE ownership over IPO 0.343 [0.41] -0.320 [-0.30] -0.010 [-0.01] -2.302 [-1.06] 
Economic control     
Ratio stock market capitalization to GDP -0.007 [-1.37]† -0.009 [-1.31]† -0.007 [-1.33]† -0.012 [-1.33]† 
     
No Obs. = 0 131 131 131 131 
No Obs. = 1 65 65 65 65 
No. Obs. 196 196 196 196 
Wald test for exogeneity statistic (No. 
variables) 
2.86(1) 10.65(3)* 3.19(2) 12.67(6)* 
Wald statistic (No. variables) 46.73(38) † 52.14(41) 46.82(40) † 44.72(44) 
a
 Industry and time (year) fixed effects included in all models; b Z-statistics are in parentheses; 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.005 
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Figure 1. Extent of control of Bank of Africa business group, 2011 
 







BoA West Africa AFH Ocean Indien 
BoA Kenya ** 
*** 





































































































































































Appendix Table 1.  Data sources 
Table documenting a non-exhaustive representation of data and information sources from across Africa 
Market Information source 
North Africa Databases:  Al Zawya (see website at: http://www.zawya.com/);  Mubasher investment reporting 
(http://www.mubasher.net/en/Index.aspx); Bloomberg LLP; Business Week 
  
Algeria Websites:  Bourse d'Algérie [SGBV] (htp://www.sgbv.dz);  Commission d'Organisation et des 
Surveillance des Opérations de Bourse [COSOB] (http://www.cosob.org/) 
Telephone interviews and direct correspondence:  M. Hamdi and Mme. Haffar (Bourse d’Alger) 
  
Egypt Websites:  Egyptian Stock Exchange [EGX] (http://www.egx.com.eg/english/homepage.aspx); 
The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority 
(http://www.efsa.gov.eg/content/IFIE/about_efsa.html);  Central Bank of Egypt 
(http://www.cbe.org.eg/English/) 
Telephone interviews (unstructured) to obtain data: Mohammed Omran (Chairman, EGX) 
Cairo-based interviews: Ayman Raafat (Market Control, EGX); Hebatallah El Serafi (Research & 
Market Development, EGX); Yasmin El-Khatib (PR & Communications, EGX) 
  
Morocco Websites:  Bourse de Casablanca (http://www.casablanca-bourse.com/);  Le Conseil Déontologique 
des Valeurs Mobilières [CDVM] (http://www.cdvm.gov.ma/) 
Casablanca-based interviews to obtain data:  Mme. Meryem Tazi (Chef de Produits, Service 
Marketing, Bourse de Casablanca); Mme. Amina Zouaoui (Analyste, Service Négociation, Bourse de 
Casablanca) 
  
Tunisia Websites:  Bourse de Tunis (http://www.bvmt.com.tn/);  Conseil du Marché Financier [CMF] 
(http://www.cmf.org.tn/); Central Bank of Tunisia (http://www.bct.gov.tn/) 
Tunis-based interviews: M. Hatem Zribi (Direction de la Promotion du Marché, Bourse de Tunis); 
Mme. Maher Chtourou (Banque Centrale de Tunisie library) 





Databases:  African financials annual reports (http://www.africanfinancials.com/); Invest Africa 
annual reports (http://investinginafrica.net/african-stock-markets/); Thomson Perfect Information 
portal;  Bloomberg LLP; Business Week 
 
East Africa  
Kenya Websites:  Nairobi securities exchange (https://www.nse.co.ke/);  Capital Markets Authority Kenya 
(http://www.cma.or.ke/); Daily Nation business journal (http://www.nation.co.ke/) 
Local Nairobi-based interviews:  Public relations officer, Nairobi Stock Exchange;  Investment 
Manager, Suntra Investment Bank, Kenya 
  
Mauritius Websites:  Stock Exchange of Mauritius [SEM] (http://www.stockexchangeofmauritius.com/) 
  
Seychelles Websites:  Trop-X Seychelles stock exchange (http://www.trop-x.com/) 
  
Tanzania Websites:  Dar Es Salaam stock exchange (http://www.dse.co.tz/) 
Telephone procurement of listing prospectus from M. Stimali, Tanzania Tea Packers Ltd 
  
Rwanda Websites:  Rwanda stock exchange (http://rse.rw/);  Capital Market Authority (http://cma.rw/) 
  
Uganda Websites:  Uganda securities exchange [USE] (http://www.use.or.ug/); Capital Markets Authority 
(http://www.cmauganda.co.ug/) 
Procurement of annual reports:  Kampala-based USE library 
Kampala-based interviews:  Investment Management team, Crane Bank, Kampala;  Head of trading, 
USE trading floor, Kampala;  Investment Manager, African Alliance Securities, Kampala;  Head of 
equities trading, Standard Chartered Bank, Kampala 
West Africa  
Nigeria Websites:  Nigerian stock exchange [NSE] (http://www.nse.com.ng/Pages/default.aspx); Securities 
and Exchange Commission Nigeria (http://www.sec.gov.ng/) 
Lagos-based procurement of annual reports and listings prospectuses from NSE library, Lagos 
Lagos-based interviews:  M. Obaseki (President of Operations, NSE);  Mme. Hauwa M. Audu 
(Founder CEO, Amyn Investments and stockbroking, Lagos) 
  
BVRM Websites:  BRVM main site (http://www.brvm.org) 
Cote d’Ivoire:   
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Procurement of annual reports:  Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoire)-based library for BRVM 
Abidjan-based interviews: 
BRVM exchange:  Emmanuel Zamble (Market operations manager, BRVM); Khassim Diop 
(Chargée de développement du Marché, BRVM); Abdoulaye Sogoba (Assistant chargée de la 
formation, BRVM) 
Abidjan brokers:  M. Auguste Kouakou (Gniman-Finance SA, Abidjan); M. Hermann Boua (Hudson 
et Cie, Abidjan) 
 
Mali:  Bamako-based interviews:  M. Amadou Djeri Bocoum (Directeur de l’Antenne Nationale de 
Bourse du Mali, Bamako); M. Alassane Sissoko (Responsable des études et de la négociation, 
Société de Gestion et d'Intermédiation (SGI) du Mali SA, Bamako) 
  
Ghana Websites:  Ghana stock exchange (http://www.gse.com.gh/) 
Accra-based interviews: 
Ghana stock exchange:  Worlanyo Amoa (Senior Manager, Research and Product Devlopment, GSE) 
Ghana Brokers:  Armah I. J. Akotey (Vice President, Databank Brokerage and Investment Banking, 
Accra, Ghana); Edem Akpenyo (HFC Brokerage Services, Accra, Ghana); Kafui Asare (Head of 
Client Relations, SAS Investment Management, Accra, Ghana); Haruna Gariba (Head of Client 
Relations, Merchant Bank of Ghana Ltd, Accra, Ghana) 
  
Cameroon Websites:  Doula stock exchange (http://www.douala-stock-exchange.com/) 
  
Cape Verde Website:  Cape Verde stock exchange [BVC] (http://www.bvc.cv/) 
Telephone based interviews and procurement of data:  Edmilson Mendonça (Operations Manager, 
BVC);  Ronnie Machado (Compliance Manager, BVC) 
  
Sierra Leone Telephone-based interviews and procurement of data:  M. Gibrilla Sesay (Operations Manager, 
Sierra Leone stock exchange);  M. Michael Collier (Deputy President, Rokel Commercial Bank, 
Freetown, Sierra Leone);  Jacob Kanu and Daniel Thomas (CEO’s of independent local licensed 
stockbrokers, Freetown) 
 
Southern Africa  
Botswana Website:  Botswana stock exchange [BSE] (http://www.bse.co.bw/) 
Telephone interviews and data procurement: Kopane Bolokwe (Operations officer, BSE) 
Gabarone-based interviews with Head of Operations, BSE;  President of Stock Brokers Botswana 
  
Malawi Websites:  Malawi stock exchange [MSE] (http://www.mse.co.mw/);  The Nation business journal 
(http://mwnation.com/) 
  
Zambia Websites:  Lusaka stock exchange [LuSE] (http://www.luse.co.zm/);  The Post business journal 
(Zambia) (http://www.postzambia.com/) 
Telephone-based procurement:  Mme. Sitali Mugala (Operations Manager, Lusaka stock exchange) 
Lusaka-based interviews:  LuSE operations personnel 
  
Namibia Websites:  Namibia stock exchange [NSX] (http://nsx.com.na/) 
Windhoek-based data procurement from NSX building and library 
Telephone based procurement:  John Mandy (CEO, NSX); Loide Nakanduungile (Research Manager, 
NSX); Manda Steynberg (Operations Manager, NSX) 
  
Mozambique Websites:  Bolsa de Valores de Maputo [BVM] (http://www.bvm.co.mz/) 
Maputo-based interviews:  Señor Bruno Tembe (Técnico Superior, BVM); Señor Felisberto Navalha 
(Operations Manager, Central Bank of Mozambique) 
Maputo-based procurement from Central Bank of Mozambique annex library, Baixa, Maputo 
  
South Africa Websites:  Johannesburg stock exchange [JSE] (https://www.jse.co.za/) 
 
